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FOREWORD The Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Group of the Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) is concerned with developing more effective methods for utilizing Army manpower resources. This research represents a step toward gaining a better understanding of the effects of the Delayed Entry Program, Endeavors such as this may lead to more effective methods for managing scarce manpower resources. The Manpower and Personnel Policy Research Group (MPPRG) of the U.S. Army Research Institute examines personnel issues of particular importance to the Army. Personnel losses from the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) is one such issue, in this paper a model is developed to predict DEP loss. The model will provide an increased understanding of the DEP loss problem along with valuable information concerning identification of individuals most likely to become losses.
Procedure:
Two DEP loss models are created: one including high school graduates and nongraduates and a separate model for high school seniors Maximum likelihood logistic regression (logit) estimates are made from individual data for the first half of FY82 and FY83.
Both individual characteristics and policy variables are used in the analysis. These include age, gender, race, AFQT score, education, contracted DEP length, training MOS, region of the country, and enlistment and incentive options! scenarios are staged to measure the effect of different combinations of relevant variables .
Findings:
' ' -Several variables were found to have considerable influence in the prediction of DEP loss. Longer DEP lengths produced consistently higher loss rates Education and gender were found to be significant, with high school seniors having lower predicted DEP loss probabilities than high school graduates or nongraduates having similar personal characteristics. Females were also shown to have higher predicted loss rates than males. Army College Fund (ACF) participation also consistently reduced an individual's loss probability.
The model presents a significant improvement over previous research because it permits measurement of the effects of changing several parameters simultaneously, ultimately arriving at a DEP loss probability for an individual This allows for the identification of low and high risk categories. These categories ranged from male high school seniors (lowest risk) to female high school graduates (highest risk).
utilization of Findings-'.-* i. -.: .
The results of this analysis can be best used to identify those individuals already within the system most likely to become DEP losses. With this understanding, it would become easier to prevent its occurrence by more efficiently allocating recruiting resources. Results can also be used in conjunction with one of the currently used forecasting models, obtaining a more accurate estimate of accessions. 
II. THE DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM
:^ -t t; .
The Delayed Entry Program is a major organizational innovation assisting both recruiting and training. This section discussess the main features of the DEP, including some of its positive and negative aspects.
The DEP serves two direct purposes. It manages the flow of accessions and aids in attracting qualified individuals to the Army. Upon signing a contract, a person can either enter the DEP or become a "direct ship", and immediately access. In FY81 over 98 percent of all Army enlistees participated in the DEP (Schmitz and Nelson 1984) . The program allows an eligible individual up to 12 months before accessing. While in the program.
an individual is considered a reservist, collecting no pay but accruing time in service for longevity raises.
DEP length varies by individual and current Army policy. For example, while a male non-prior service (NPS) AFQT category I-IJIA (above average) high school senior may be allowed to remain in the DEP for 12 months, a high school graduate with similar characteristics may only be permitted 3 months.
Maximum permitted DEP length has also varied over time, depending upon accession goals of the Army. When immediate accession goals must be met, maximum DEP lengths will be shorter than when recruiting is not as constrained.
As previously noted, the DEP also produces several indirect impacts. Morey (1983) However, a limited amount of DEP loss may actually be desirable.
Participation in the DEP has been shown to reduce later attrition. A Rand study (Buddin 1981) found lower attrition rates among DEP participants, particularly those remaining in the DEP over three months. Baldwin et al. (1982) also found lower attrition rates among DEP participants. Some who become DEP losses may have attrited at a later date. Since the cost of keeping a person in the DEP is likely to be lower than the cost incurred during and after training, it would be more cost effective to lose the individual early in the process, before too sizable an investment is made.
With widespread use of the DEP, the problem of DEP loss becomes extremely important.
(A person who drops out of the DEP at any time prior to accessing will be defined a "DEP loss".) By the end of FY83, over 7 percent of all NPS AFQT category I-IIIA males were being lost in the DEP (USAREC 1984) . A loss rate of over 11 percent for all participants was experienced early in 1984 (Maze 1984a) , intensifying the situation. 2. The ages associated with highest DEP loss rates were 18-19 and over 3. Females had higher loss rates than males. 4. Higher loss rates were found where longer DEP lengths were contracted. 5. There was high variability in DEP loss within MOS and CMF.
To attract high quality individuals ("high quality" will refer to AFQT category I-IIIA HSGs and HSSRs) to specific MOS or enlistment terms, the Army currently employs a set of enlistment and incentive options.
The enlistment options most often considered include: sociodemographic variables, the total DEP loss picture may be more clearly understood.
•One of the hypotheses tested is that the longer a person remains in the DEP, the greater the loss risk. The effect of time in DEP was examined using the contract data aggregated into three educational groupings at time of contract: high school graduates (HSG), non-high school graduates (NHS), and high school seniors (HSSR). Figure 1 shows FY82 and FY83 loss rates (first six months of the fiscal year) for HSGs by lertgth of DEP. An upward trend in loss rate as DEP length increases is clearly evident. Also, while loss rates remained similar at short DEP periods, longer DEP resulted in higher loss rates in FY83. By nine months contracted DEP, the loss rate had exceeded 25 percent. Similar, although more severe results are apparent among NHS contracts (Figure 2 ). While the loss rate for a nine month DEP was approximately 20 percent in FY82, the rate rose to over 35 percent in FY83.
High school seniors face different DEP constraints than either HSG or NHS contracts. They are permitted longer DEPs (up to one year) and are not fully exposed to the job market while completing school. Therefore, DEP loss patterns are likely to be different from the other two educational groups.
This is verified in Figure 3 . While loss rates increased with longer contracted DEP, the rise was more gradual, not accelerating as quickly as for HSG and NHS contracts. During the two periodis, the loss rate peaked at a' little over 8 percent (at ten months contracted DEP in FY82:). In contrast with the other two groups, loss rates dropped slightly in FY83.
Two equations were specified for each year: one including both HSG and NHS contracts and another for HSSR contracts. It has already been noted that seniors are under different DEP constraints than HSG or NHS contracts. This was evident when examining the distribution by month in DEP. DEP loss is uncommon for seniors at short periods because of the likelihood that they are still in school and not pursuing other options. Seniors may also be less influenced by current economic conditions, not having been, fully exposed to the job market. The effect of DEP policy on HSSRs appears to be longer contracted DEP periods and lower loss rates (when controlling for months in DEP). To use this information fully the separate model was necessary.
Preliminary examination of the data was accomplished using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The final combinations of variables were then' used in the specification of a maximum likelihood logistic regression (logit) model. Recommended by Amemiya (1981) , this two step procedure was followed for several reasons. OLS requires substantially less computing time than the logit. While the algorithm used by the Statistical Analysis System (SAS)
completes an OLS run in a single step, several iterations are required for ■ a.. discussion of the logit model can be found in Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981) , Bickel and Doksum (1977), or Amemiya (1981) .
Contracts signed during the first six months of FY82 and FY83 were examined using USAREC Minimaster contract files (updated through the end of the fiscal year). While some of these cases remained open at the end of each fiscal year, the number was relatively small (approximately five percent).
By using two fiscal year's data, consistency of the effects of variables could be examined. Records with missing or invalid information for the variables examined were eliminated. The data set included only those persons who participated in the DEP for at least one day. Approximately 95 percent of the total number of cases took one of five primary options (training of choice, unit of choice, station of choice, airborne, and the two year option).
In order to limit the analysis to these options, the remaining five percent were eliminated. Approximately 67,000 cases remained for analysis in FY82 and 81,600 cases in FY83. Characteristics of the data sets can be seen on Table 2 . Table 3 .
.The DEP loss models identified females as high risk individuals. This variable was found to yield consistently significant results, all with positive signs. Due to historically lower loss rates for non-white females, they were included in a separate term. This variable was found to be negative and significant in the HSG/NHS models but provided inconsistent results for To examine the effect of particular policies and characteristics upon DEP loss, several scenarios were modeled. These include:
o Time in DEP. o AFQT differences. ., .o Enlistment and incentive options.
In the first scenario, the effect of time in DEP is examined. Particular supply groups are studied, with variables other than time in DEP held constant. Figure 4 shows graphically the loss probability by contracted ' months in DEP for a typical upper quartile male HSG (white, AFQT 85, three year enlistment, no options taken). As was evident from observed data, the model predicts much higher loss probabilities for long contracted DEP periods in FY83. At six months contracted DEP, the FY83 loss probability exceeds 8 percent. Few HSG contracts remain in the DEP this long, however.
.[ "^. Table 4 shows that the predicted loss rate actually fell slightly in FY83, with a loss probability of only a little over 3 percent at six months DEP. This is less than one half the loss probability for a HSG. White, Three Year Enlistment, No Options • Evaluated at AFQT = 85 •» Evaluated at AFQT = 60 These are both low risk categories of individuals, however. Non-high school graduates and females have much higher predicted loss probabilities At six months DEP (very few NHS contracts are permitted to DEP longer), the loss probability for a male NHS Graduate (AFQT 60) is close to .18 in FY83 over twice the predicted FY82 loss rate. The contrast between years is even »ore distinct in the case of females. The predicted loss probability at six months for a female HSG (AFQT 60) is approximately .19 in FYSS. Female HSSRs experience lower predicted loss rates and a representative of this group had a predicted loss probability of about .10 at six months contracted DEP in FYSS. With the exception of HSSRs. all groups experience higher loss probabilities at long DEP periods in FY83 models.
AFQT plays a minor part in the DEP loss models.' Coefficients were generally small and not significant. Figure 5 examines predicted loss probability range for AFQT category I-JJIA (AFQT 50-99) male HSG contracts (white, three year term, no options). At four months contracted DEP (a typical DEP period), the difference is less than one percent in the loss probability, and only four percent at nine months. The effects of enlistment and incentive options were examined. In each case, a white male with an AFQT score of 85 and four year enlistment term (most likely term for having taken options) was chosen. Only time in DEP was varied. In this manner, the relative effect of having taken an enlistment bonus, the Army College Fund, both options, or neither could be examined for
HSGs and HSSRs at different DEP periods. In FY82 a contract who had taken the ACF, bonus, or both would have had a lower loss probability than having taken no incentive. The lowest projected loss probability was for a person enlisting with a bonus and ACF (Results can be seen in appendix D). Figure 6 points out graphically the contrast in loss rates at a DEP period of four months. A high school graduate with an enlistment bonus and ACF in FY82
would have had a projected DEP loss probability of two percent, about half the loss probability for the same person taking no options. The same relationship holds true for an HSSR.
As previously noted, the effect of all options diminished in FY83. In this case the results were not statistically significant and therefore inconclusive.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented indicates that predictable DEP loss patterns do occur. Several of the findings concur with those found by others: From the models, high and low risk supply categories can be identified.
Figures 7 and 8 provide a ranking of these groups, evaluated at 4 months DEP.
(Results were estimated for a 3 year term and taking no options. In order to provide accurate comparisons, HSGs and NHS graduates were evaluated at age 18 while HSSRs were estimated at age 17.). AFQT ranges are also shown. As expected, male HSSRs present the lowest risk as a group, with a small AFQT range (less than one percent). This indicates that all male HSSRs should be treated similarly with respect to DEP loss. Male HSGs present the second lowest risk. In this case the AFQT differences are broader (about 1.5 to 2 percent). Female HSSRs were next, followed by male NHS graduates. Female
HSGs were the highest risk category. As shown in the figures, there is some overlapping of predicted loss rates. For example, in Figure 11 predicted loss probabilities for male NHS graduates range from 7.2 to 9.6 percent and range from 8.8 to 11.5 percent for female HSGs.
Some of the other findings presented here have not previously been reported;
° 111°"^ military service was not found to be significant in predicting DEP loss. ^ o There was no measurable difference in predicted rates from different regions of the country, o Non-white females exhibited lower loss rates than white females, o Training MOS was not found to be significant. It is not reasonable to assume, however, that recruiting strictly to achieve minimum DEP loss is attainable or even desirable. There are tradeoffs to be made with other Army policies (such as longer DEP periods being associated with lower attrition rates). The factors associated with DEP loss need to be systematically compared to behavior after enlisting.
The results of this analysis can be best used to identify those individuals already within the system most likely to become DEP losses. These persons could then be monitored. This model of DEP behavior was developed from cross-sectional data. This tends to hold constant many significant factors, such as the economy, relative military to civilian pay, and social attitudes toward the military.
(While differences over time were examined somewhat by using data from two different years, further research is necessary.) It would be important to explore whether these kinds of factors significantly affect people in the DEP. Knowledge of these relationships would enhance the ability to forecast enlistments from contracts. 
